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In this paper, we explore the impact of a tax reform in some provinces of China which 
eliminated  the  value-added  tax  on  some  investment  goods.    While  the  goal  of  the 
experiment was to encourage upgrading of technology, our results suggest that there was 
no evident increase overall in fixed investment, and employment fell significantly in the 
treated provinces and sectors. The reform reduced the total number of employees for all 
types of firms. For domestic firms, it reduced employment by almost 8%.  Our results are 
robust to a variety of approaches, and suggest that the primary impact of the policy has 
been to induce labor-saving growth.  This experiment has since been extended to the rest 
of China. 






       Much of the literature in public finance focuses on the role of tax reforms in affecting 
firm behavior.  Policy makers in many countries use tax incentives to encourage firm 
investment, and China is no different. In China, the value-added tax is the major source 
of fiscal revenue for the Chinese government, generating much more revenues than any 
other types of tax. In 2002, the revenue from value-added tax was 814.4 billion RMB, 
accounting  for  around  48%  of  the  state  total  tax  revenue  in  that  year.    In  2009,  the 
Chinese Ministry of Finance estimated that VAT revenue accounted for approximately 31 
percent of China’s overall revenue.
1  
       Beginning in 2004, the Chinese government implemented a value-added tax reform 
in three northeast provinces which removes fixed asset investment from the value-added 
tax base. The reform has since been extended to the whole country, beginning in 2009. 
The objective of the 2004 reform was to encourage firms to raise investment on fixed 
assets  for  production  (excluding  structures)  and  to  upgrade  their  machinery  and 
equipment. The goals of the 2009 reform were similar, but in addition the government 
expressed the need to provide additional assistance to domestic enterprises to help them 
weather the adverse effects of the crisis, as well as to encourage fixed asset investments 
to promote an industrial policy now focused on more technologically advanced sectors. 
2  
       In this paper, we use a firm-level panel dataset ranging from 1998 to 2007 to identify 
the effect of the 2004 value-added tax reduction in selected provinces on firm behavior, 
                                                 
1 See www.dorsey.com/china_vat_reform 
2 According to the People’s Daily Online, December 9, 2008, quoting Zheng Jianxin, deputy director general of the 
taxation department of China’s Ministry of Finance, “The VAT reform would encourage investment and technological 
upgrading at Chinese companies, boost domestic demand, improve companies’ competitive strength and play a positive 
role in helping companies tackle the financial crisis”.  The article also states that “The reform was aimed at a shift from 
the existing production-based to a consumption-based VAT regime, which would enable companies to get tax 
deductions on spending on fixed assets, Zheng said, adding that this would reduce the tax burden on companies by 




including  employment,  investment,  profit,  productivity,  and  exports.  Although  tax 
reduction is an important fiscal policy, identifying the effect of it is challenging because 
of the endogeneity of taxes. The government’s choice of tax reduction in areas or sectors 
is non-random, and usually depends on sector or firm attributes such as size, productivity, 
capital intensity, ownership, etc. This creates a potential selection bias in policy treatment 
and makes it hard to identify the causal effect of tax policies.  
        Consider the value-added tax reform of China in 2004: the three northeast provinces 
were chosen as the first pilot group because while many coastal cities had undergone 
rapid changes and upgrades in both capital assets and technology after the opening-up of 
the Chinese economy to the world, the traditional industrial base in northeast regions are 
left behind in the race of technological advancement and prosperity. Encouraging firms in 
these provinces to invest more on fixed productive assets to upgrade their technology, 
and to revitalize these old industrial bases was the main reason to implement the value-
added tax reform in these provinces first.
3 As a result, we cannot identify the causal effect 
of the value-added tax reform without first addressing potential endogeneity issues.  
       We  use  a  nonparametric  technique,  propensity  score  matching  combined  with 
difference-in-difference  estimation,  to  identify  the  causal  effect  of  value-added  tax 
reduction. This method has two advantages. First, it emphasizes the comparability of the 
treated and control firms by excluding firms that are not comparable. Second, it relaxes 
the parametric assumptions associated with regression-based techniques such as the linear 
regression framework. We assess the credibility of the matching procedure using absolute 
standardized bias measure and formal paired t-tests. Moreover, we combine the matching 
                                                 
3 According to the Xinhua News Agency on December 22, 2005, “The experiment, which moves the tax from 
production to tax on consumer spending has encouraged northeast China to increase investment in machinery and 




technique with difference-in-difference estimation to deal with concerns about possible 
unobservable firm characteristics that share the same time dynamics for both treatment 
and control firms.   
       Our estimation results suggest that while the reform was effective in reducing the 
value-added tax paid by firms, its impact on firm behavior in other ways is puzzling.  The 
policy  significantly  reduced  firms’  total  number  of  employees  for  both  domestic  and 
foreign firms. Second, the impact of the tax reduction on firm productive investment was 
limited: while there is some evidence that SOEs increased their investment, the impact 
was not significant for most other types of enterprises. The impact of the policy on firm 
profits  was  similar:  while  most  of  the  benefits  accrued  to  SOEs,  other  firms  were 
generally unaffected. Finally, the tax reform did not have any significant effect on firm 
productivity for all types of firms, and it decreased export intensity for most types of 
firms.  
       Our  results  differ  in  significant  ways  from  Nie,  Fang,  and  Lie  (2010),  who  also 
explore the impact of the value-added tax reform in China.  They find smaller, but still 
negative effects on employment and positive, significant effects on fixed asset investment.  
Our results differ in large part from Nie, Fang, and Lie (2010) for two reasons.  First, 
they only had one year of data following the 2004 reform, while we have three years, 
which allows us to identify the longer term effects.  In addition, they do not address the 
potential  endogeneity  of  the  reform  targets,  while  we  explicitly  address  this  through 
nonparametric propensity score matching techniques.  Using their same approach, we 




very short-term.  Even for SOEs, the positive impact on fixed investment disappears if we 
include 2006 and 2007. 
       Our evidence suggests that the primary effects of the tax reform were to reduce 
value-added tax payments and cut employment, as firms shifted to more capital-intensive 
or  labor-saving  technologies.    While  there  were  some  small  increases  in  productive 
investments, they appear to have been concentrated in SOEs and were not large.  Instead, 
SOEs appear to have benefited primarily through increased profits.  One puzzle is why, in 
light of these limited gains, the policy was extended to the rest of China.  One possible 
explanation is that the VAT reform was part of a package of measures for fiscal stimulus 
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
        The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the 
value-added tax system and the tax reform in China. Section 3 discusses the identification 
strategy. Section 4 presents estimation results. Section 5 shows robustness checks and 
results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Background 
       Mainland China introduced the value-added tax as part of a major general tax reform 
initiative in 1994. There are three types of value-added taxes with different tax bases: the 
first type is a GDP-type value-added tax with GDP as the tax base; under that system, no 
deductions are allowed for capital investment and depreciation when calculating the tax 
base. The tax is equivalent to a sales tax applicable to both consumer and capital goods. 




consumption as the tax base. The third type is a consumption-based value-added tax, for 
which the tax base is consumption with investment excluded.  
       Prior to 2004, China adopted the first type of value-added tax. The value-added tax 
rate is 17% for most products and 13% for some products such as agricultural products. 
Export enterprises receive value-added tax refunds as an export incentive, with refund 
rates ranging from 9% to 17%. The GDP-type value-added tax is effective in ensuring 
fiscal revenue for the country but does not encourage capital investment. When firms 
purchase equipment, they pay value-added taxes on the input which is included in the 
purchase price of the equipment. But this part is not deductible against output value-
added taxes associated with the finished goods. When they sell the product, consumers 
indirectly pay value-added taxes again for the same equipment in the form of higher sales 
prices. As a result, there is a double taxation on equipment purchases.  
        In order to promote an equitable market environment and to stimulate investment, in 
July 2004, the Chinese government selected three northeastern provinces as a pilot area to 
implement the consumption-type of value-added tax. In these provinces, value-added tax 
payers in six selected industries, including agricultural product processing, equipment 
manufacturing, petrochemical, metallurgy, ship building and automobile manufacturing, 
were allowed to deduct expenditure on fixed assets from the value-added tax base. This 
reform was expected to eliminate double taxation and alleviate firms’ tax burden, which 
as a result could lower prices for consumers and encourage more investment on fixed 
assets. At the end of that year, the government further included military products and 
high-tech products as pilot sectors and extended the scope of the tax deduction from 




to six provinces in the central area, including 26 cities. In 2008, eastern Inner Mongolia 
was further included, and finally in January 2009, the consumption-based value-added 
tax policy was implemented in all sectors and provinces of China.  
         
3. Data, Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics  
3.1 Dataset 
        The data for this analysis comes from a large dataset developed and maintained by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). The NBS dataset contains annual firm-
level unbalanced survey data of all “above scale” industrial firms with annual sales of 
more than 5 million RMB. On average, around 220,000 firms per year from 1998 to 2007 
are  included  in  the  dataset,  spanning  37  two-digit  manufacturing  industries  and  31 
provinces  or  province-equivalent  municipal  cities.  They  account  for  most  of  China’s 
industrial value added and have 22% of China’s urban employment in 2005. 
        The  combined  dataset  contains  detailed  information  about  each  firm’s  identity, 
address, industry classification, incorporation year, ownership types, new products and 
total value of output, total fixed assets, fixed assets for production, sales revenue, profit, 
total  workforce,  export  sales,  total  industrial  sales,  employee  educations,  income  and 
value added tax payable, etc. These are the key variables based on which we estimate 
firm level total factor productivity and value added tax reform impacts. 
         The  original  dataset  includes  2,226,104  firm-year  observations.  Since  the  paper 
focuses  on  manufacturing  firms,  we  eliminate  non-manufacturing  observations.  To 
further clean the sample, we delete observations whose information on variables such as 




negative or zero values for key variables such as output, total workforce, capital, and total 
wages. In addition, observations are dropped if total assets are less than liquid assets or 
total fixed assets. After implementing these data cleaning procedures, we obtain a sample 
of 1,894,660 observations for analysis.   
3.2 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
         In Table 1, we provide summary statistics for key variables of the analysis. The 
main outcome variables we consider include employment, investment, profit, total factor 
productivity  (TFP),  and  export  intensity.  Employment  is  defined  as  total  number  of 
employees. Investment is measured in two ways: the first measure is fixed assets for 
production, and the second measure is the growth of fixed assets plus depreciation. Profit 
is rescaled by industrial sales. We did not delete firms with negative profits because 
otherwise it is not a random sample. Value of total fixed assets and fixed assets for 
production is deflated by the fixed assets investment index. TFP is the firm level total 
factor  productivity  estimated  using  OLS  with  firm  fixed  effects.  Export  intensity  is 
calculated by the ratio of export procurement to total industrial sales. Our key controls 
include firm size, age, HKTM share, foreign share and state shares. Firm size is measured 
by total values of output, which are deflated by the sector-specific ex-factory price index 
of industrial products. HKTM share, foreign share, and state share are defined as the 
share of the firm’s total equity owned by Hong Kong-Taiwan-Macau investors, investors 
from other countries, and the state, respectively.  These three firm level controls are 
continuous variables ranging from 0 to 1. 
         In Figure 1, we illustrate the evolution of the value added tax in treated and control 




value added tax of firms in treated sectors in control provinces does not change much 
from year to year. Second, we compare the evolution of value added tax between firms in 
treated sectors in treated provinces and firms in treated sectors in control provinces.  We 
can see that before 2004, the value added tax of treated firms is always higher than that of 
control firms in treated sectors. However, one year after the value added tax reform was 
implemented in 2004, there is a significant decrease in the value added tax paid by treated 
firms, it reaches a similar value to control firms in treated sectors in 2005, and falls in 
2006 and 2007.  
  In Table 2, we compare the evolution of the value added tax from 1998 to 2007 
between firms with different ownership. For foreign invested firms, the value added tax 
did not decrease after the reform was implemented; it even increased a little bit after 2004, 
and the trend is very similar between treatment and control firms. This is because before 
the reform, there were already some tax exemption policies for foreign invested firms. 
For domestic firms, there is no significant change in value added tax before and after 
2004 for control firms; for treated firms, the value added tax was stable before 2004 but 
fell annually beginning in 2004. This trend holds for both state owned and non-state 
owned domestic firms, and is more significant for non state owned domestic firms. 
 
4. Identification Strategy  
         In order to identify the causal effect of value added tax reform on a firm’s behavior, 
the best way is to compare the behavior of a firm that is exposed to the reform with that 
of the same firm if it had not experienced the reform. However, this sort of counterfactual 




sectors in certain provinces, the assignment was not random. It is possible that these 
sectors or provinces were chosen because they fell behind other sectors or provinces in 
investment, or because they are more capital intensive and reducing the value added tax 
is  more  important  for  these  types  of  enterprises.  As  a  result,  the  key  difficulty  with 
identifying the causal effect of value added tax reform is endogenous selection. To solve 
the  endogeneity  problem,  we  use  a  two-stage  identification  approach.  First,  we  use 
nonlinear propensity score matching techniques to construct a control group of firms that 
match  most  closely  firms  that  have  been  treated  based  on  observable  characteristics; 
Second, we estimate the program impact using the difference-in-difference approach to 
remove all unobservable effects that have the same time dynamics in the treatment and 
matched control group.  
4.1 Propensity Score Matching  
        While  a  number  of  methods  are  available  for  estimating  treatment  effects  using 
nonlinear matching techniques, we adopt a procedure using Gaussian kernel matching 
introduced by Becker and Ichino (2002). To identify the most appropriate control group, 
we need to specify a list of covariates as key determinants of policy assignment. Here we 
use sector, foreign share, state share, export share, firm size, age, capital, and productivity 
as matching covariates, or in other words, firms in the control group are matched to the 
treatment group on the basis of the pre-treatment (1998-2003) mean of these observables. 
         There are two steps to test whether the propensity score matching method works 
well. First, we need to estimate whether the covariates we chose are actually important 
determinants of policy treatment. For this, we estimate a probit model for the likelihood 
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Where Treatmentij is a dummy variable which equals 1 if firm i in sector j was exposed 
to the tax reform in 2004 and 0 otherwise, and Sectorij includes a set of two-digit sector 
dummies. Second, we calculate the standardized differences for covariates in the probit 
regression to assess the performance of our propensity score matching. Specifically, for 
each covariate, we take the average difference between treated and matched control firms, 
and then normalize it by the pooled standard deviation of the covariate in the treatment 
and control groups, which is referred as the absolute standardized bias (ASB). While 
there is no clear criterion for the value of ASB, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggests 
that a value of 20 is large. Moreover, we perform a formal pairwise t-test comparison 
between  treated  and  matched  control  firms  to  see  whether  there  are  any  significant 
differences.  Throughout  we  impose  the  common  support  condition  and  confine  our 
attention  to  the  matched  firms  falling  within  the  support  of  the  propensity  score 
distribution of the treated group.  
4.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
        Using difference-in-differences is likely to improve the quality of non-experimental 
evaluation studies because it removes the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity across 
firms, such as sector specific effects, managerial behavior, etc.  Here we define the first 
difference of outcome variables, including total number of employees, investment, profit, 
TFP, and export in two ways. The first method is to take the difference between post-
treatment (2005-2007) and pre-treatment (1998-2003) means of outcome variables, which 




after the policy treatment. The second method is to take the growth of outcome variables 
from 2003, which is one year before the policy enacted, to 2007, which is the end of the 
sample period. In this case, we only keep firms that exist in the data for both 2003 and 
2007.    
         We now explicitly show the formula we use to combine propensity score matching 
with  difference-in-difference  estimation.  In  the  standard  difference-in-difference 
estimation,  we  treat  each  of  the  firms  linearly  and  with  the  same  weight,  while  the 
difference-in-difference  estimator  paired  with  propensity  score  matching  allows  us  to 
include only treated firms within the common support and picks control firms according 
to the metric function specific to the matching method. The estimator is as follows:  
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Where  is the set of treated firms that falls within the common support   ,    is the 
set of control firms, and    if the number of treated firms in the common support set.   is 
outcome variables and   measures the probability of receiving treatment based on the 
vector of firm characteristics      :  
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Where  (.) is the Gaussian normal function where     =  
 
   ﾠ
   and    is a bandwidth 
parameter.      is the estimator of the causal effect of the value added tax reform, and 
we obtain standard error using bootstrap procedure.  
 
5. Estimation Results  
5.1 Propensity Score Matching Estimation Results 
        In this section, we analyze the estimation result of the probit model for the policy 
treatment and the matching balance test. First, in Table 3, we show the results of the 
probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if 
a firm was included in the value added tax reform treatment group and 0 otherwise. The 
objective  is  to  check  whether  the  covariates  we  chose  are  important  determinants  of 
policy treatment. All covariates are measured by the mean before the policy treatment. 
Columns (1) to (3) reports estimation results when we define first difference of outcome 
variables as the growth from 2003 to 2007, while columns (4) to (6) displays results if we 
define it as the difference between pre and post treatment means.  
       We find that for both domestic and foreign firms, most covariates are significant 
determinants of policy treatment. Specifically, firms are more likely to receive policy 
treatment if they have lower foreign shares or HKTM shares, or higher state shares. 
Export-oriented firms are less likely to be treated, and firms with less output or more 
capital are more likely to be included. Younger firms or firms with higher productivity 
have a higher probability of being selected.  The results confirm that the focus of the 




less competition through export activity, and smaller firms.  These results are consistent 
with  the  anecdotal  and  press  reports  that  the  goal  of  the  initial  2004  reform  was  to 
encourage upgrading in the more backward northeastern provinces. 
        Table 4 reports the balancing test results based on the Gaussian kernel matching. 
The ASB measures reported in column (3) are all below 5% in absolute value in the 
matched sample. Adopting the matching method reduced bias substantially as shown in 
column (4). Moreover, there’s no significant difference in covariates we chosen between 
treated and matched samples. The only exception is that the ASB measure of logTFP 
increases greatly after matching. However, after matching the measure is still well below 
20, and the t-test of difference between treatment and matched groups is not significant. 
Overall, the quality of the matching procedure is good and provides a solid foundation for 
the difference-in-difference estimation in the next stage.  
5.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimation Results 
         Having demonstrated the quality of the matching procedure, we then present the 
difference-in-difference matching estimation results. As discussed earlier, we use two 
specifications to define first difference of outcome variables. Results are listed in Tables 
5.1 and 5.2 for these two specifications, respectively. Since the estimation results do not 
vary much between different specifications, we will focus on Table 5.1.  We present 
results for the overall sample, domestic (state-owned and non-state-owned), and foreign 
firms separately.  
         We begin by looking at the effect of the tax reform on value-added taxes paid by 
firms. The estimates show that overall, the reported value-added tax paid (rescaled by 




effect is statistically and economically significant given that the mean of value-added tax 
before the policy was implemented was around 0.09.  This suggests that the value-added 
tax reform effectively decreased taxes paid by treated firms.  The magnitude of effect 
varies by firm ownership. The effect is largest for domestic state-owned firms: the reform 
reduced the value-added tax ratio by 7.6% for treated firms. For domestic non-state-
owned firms, the reform also reduced tax paid by around 0.7%. These numbers indicate 
that the tax reform reduced the tax burden for SOEs ten times more than for non-SOEs.  
Taxes  paid  by  treated  foreign  firms  also  decreased  by  0.5%  but  the  effect  is  not 
significant. This is consistent with the fact that the reform itself focused on domestic and 
particularly state owned enterprises, while foreign firms already faced favorable value-
added tax policies before the reform. In summary, value-added tax reform significantly 
reduced the tax paid by domestic firms, but did not have a large impact on foreign firms.  
        We then turn to the impact of the tax reduction on firm behavior. We consider 
employment first. Results suggest that the reform reduced the total number of employees 
for all types of firms. For domestic firms, it reduced employment by almost 8%, but the 
effect is only significant for domestic non-state-owned firms. For state-owned firms, the 
magnitude is around 6% but it is not statistically significant. This might because we do 
not have sufficient power for state-owned firms. The tax reform has a smaller effect on 
employment of foreign firms: they reduced employment by around 6%.  
        Second, we estimate the impact of tax reform on firm investment. In this paper, we 
use two measures for firm investment. The first one is fixed assets for production, which 
includes  equipment,  machinery,  etc.;  the  second  measurement  is  the  growth  of  fixed 




reform did not influence the investment behavior of domestic non-state-owned firms. It 
raised state-owned firm investment by 12.26%, but the effect is only significant at the 10 
percent level. For foreign invested firms, after the reform, their investment was reduced 
by 8%. However, if we define investment as growth of fixed assets plus depreciation, the 
impact of value-added tax reform on firm investment is insignificant for all types of firms. 
Taken together, the results suggest a shift in the composition of investment, which is 
most evident for SOEs but is not significant at conventional levels. 
         Third, the value-added tax reform affected the profit of domestic state-owned firms 
and foreign firms. It raised the ratio of profit to industrial sales of domestic state-owned 
firms by 0.48 (the sample mean of profit ratio is around 6.66), but did not affect the profit 
of domestic non-state-owned firms. However, foreign firms’ profit was reduced by a 
small amount of around 0.02 after the policy change.   Overall, domestically owned firm 
profits increased significantly, but the gains were concentrated in SOEs. 
         Fourth, we also check whether the tax reform affected firm productivity. However, 
the result suggests that the reform did not have any effect on firm productivity for any 
types of firms. The effect is small and insignificant for firms with any types of ownership. 
    Finally, we consider export activity. According to the estimation results, firms’ 
export intensity, which is measured by the share of export procurement in industrial sales, 
significantly fell after the tax reform policy. The effect holds for all firms except for 
state-owned firms. The export intensity of domestic non-state-owned firms decreased by 
0.008 (sample mean of export intensity equals 0.17) after 2004. The effect on foreign 




        In summary, the value-added tax reform reduced firms’ tax burden significantly. It 
had a significantly negative effect on employment, and the effect is very robust. While 
the main stated objective of implementing value-added tax reform was to encourage firms 
to invest more on machinery and equipment, we do not find a large and significant effect 
of the reform on firm investment for most firms. It only raised investment for domestic 
state-owned firms. Similarly, the reform only raised profits for state-owned firms, while 
profits of foreign firms fell. We did not find any significantly effect of tax reform on firm 
productivity. Finally, the policy reduced export intensity for most firms.  
 
6. Alternative Specifications 
6.1 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
        The results indicate that the reform did not generate the expected large positive 
effect on firm investment. Moreover, even for foreign firms where the value-added tax 
did not fall significantly after the reform, we see a similar effect of the policy treatment 
on employment reduction, investment and even export reduction. This suggests maybe 
there are some other targeted changes that occurred together with the value-added tax 
reform in these treated sectors and provinces, which could influence firm behavior in 
similar ways. In order to check whether the above results are actually driven by value-
added tax reduction, we use a more direct method to study the tax impact in this section.   
         While  in  the  last  section,  we  defined  policy  treatment  based  on  the  sector  and 
province in which a firm is located, it is not necessarily true that for all these firms, the 
value-added tax actually fell after 2004. A more direct way is to see whether a firm 




reduction on firm behavior to see whether we can get similar results as above. The OLS 
estimating equation is as follows:  
 _      =    +                  +       +      +     ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ(2) 
Where  _      is the difference in outcome variables before and after year 2004. We 
consider the same set of outcome variables as before, including employment, investment, 
profit, TFP, and export. As before, we use two specifications to define the difference: one 
is to take the growth from 2003 to 2007, and the other is to take the difference between 
post-treatment mean and pre-treatment mean. TaxReduction   is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the value-added tax fell after 2004 and zero otherwise.     includes firm 
level controls including foreign share, state share, export share, firm size, age, capital, 
and productivity.    is a set of sector dummies.  
         In order to solve the endogeneity problem, we use the policy change, which is a 
binary variable that takes the value of one if a firm falls in treated sectors in treated 
provinces and zero otherwise, as the instrument for the variable               . The 
advantage of this method is that we can directly go from policy change to value-added 
tax changes to specific outcomes, while the disadvantage is that there is still potential 
endogeneity if the program was not completely exogenous.     
         The OLS estimation results are listed in table 6.1 and 6.2. In Table 6.1, we show the 
result if we specify the first difference of outcome variables as the growth from 2003 to 
2007, while Table 6.2 presents results when we define it as the difference between before 
and after 2004. We will focus on Table 6.1 here since estimation results do not vary 
significantly  across  the  two  different  specifications.    The  results  in  the  first  column 




The average fall in employment for these firms ranged from 2 to nearly 6 percentage 
points.  The biggest reduction in employment in conjunction with the falling value-added 
taxes where experienced by SOEs.  However, there is no evidence of increasing physical 
capital  or  overall  investment  increase  associated  with  the  value-added  tax  reduction.  
Consistent with the reduction in employment, total factor productivity increased for those 
firms, but profits were not significantly affected. 
        The  IV  estimation  results,  where  value-added  taxes  paid  by  the  enterprise  are 
instrumented with the 2004 policy change, are reported in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. In Table 
7.1 we define differences in outcome variables as the growth from 2003 to 2007.   The 
first column reports the first stage results of regressing the dummy variable for VAT tax 
reduction  on  the  treatment.    As  expected,  the  coefficient  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant for most firms, indicating that the share of value-added taxes in sales fell for 
firms in the treatment group.   
  The results for employment are similar to our difference-in-difference matching 
estimation as well as the OLS results in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Overall, the tax reduction had 
a  negative  effect  on  the  number  of  employees.  Second,  consider  the  impact  of  tax 
reduction on firm investment, when using IV estimation, we cannot find a significant 
effect. Similarly, the IV results suggest after the value-added tax was reduced, firms’ 
profit (standardized by industrial sales) did not change significantly.  
 
6.2 Other Specifications and Robustness Tests 
In July 2007, the value-added tax reform was extended to 26 middle cities. We 




robustness of our results in two ways.  First we restricted the sample to 1998 through 
2006 and redid our estimates. Second, we used 1998-2007 but excluded the 26 middle 
cities.  The results are robust to both these extensions. 
We also reproduced the specifications employed by Nie, Fang, and Li (2010) in 
Appendix Tables 1 through 3.  In order to see why we get different results, we use their 
variable definitions, with investment defined as annual growth in fixed assets, and the 
same control variables. The dependent variable is the mean post 2004 – the mean before 
2004 and the independent variables are the means before 2004.  According to Appendix 
Table 1 columns (1) - (3), using the same years 1999-2003 and 2005, we can get the same 
sign and similar magnitudes of effects as Nie, Fang, and Li (2010).  However, if we 
extend  the  sample  to  1998-2007  and  do  the  same  estimation,  the  results  reported  in 
columns (4) - (6) show that the effect on fixed investment is much smaller and becomes 
insignificant.    There  are  other  problems  with  their  approach  in  addition  to  lack  of 
robustness over the longer time horizon. For example, they do not address the potential 
endogeneity of treatment, and their definition of investment is problematic too (the value 
of fixed assets is measured in nominal terms and depreciation is not taken into account).     
  Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3 separate the results into SOEs and non-SOEs.  The 
results in Appendix Table A.2 show that the results in Nie et al are driven by the changes 
in fixed investment across SOEs.  Comparing the first three and last three columns, which 
include  2006  and  2007,  we  see  that  the  significant  effects  on  investment  were  only 
present in 2005, and disappear if we add 2006 and 2007.  Appendix Table A.3 reports the 
results for non-SOEs, for which the impact on fixed investment was negative.  Overall, 




limited to SOEs, while the negative and significant impact on employment is evident 
across all ownership types and increases in magnitude over time. 
 
7. Conclusions 
       This paper analyzes the impact of the value-added tax reform in China on firm 
employment,  investment,  profit,  TFP,  and  export  intensity.  We  use  a  difference-in-
difference propensity score matching approach to identify the causal effect. We find that 
the reform significantly reduced firms’ tax burden. The tax reduction also reduced firm 
employment for both domestic and foreign firms, while its effect on firm investment was 
limited, and only positively significant for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The profits of 
domestic firms improved after the tax burden was partially removed, while the profits and 
investments of foreign firms fell. The impact on firm productivity is only significant for 
domestic firms and the effect is negative. Finally, for most firms, their exports fell in 
conjunction with the value-added tax reform.  
  Our results suggest that the reform was targeted at provinces with a large number of 
state owned enterprises, less foreign ownership, more capital intensity and less outward 
orientation.    Using  our  matching  estimation  as  well  as  other  approaches  such  as 
instrumental variables using the targeted sectors and provinces as instruments for the 
change in value-added taxes, we find that the 2004 tax reform led firms to use fewer 
workers, increased profits for SOEs, and led to some increase in productive investment 
among SOEs but no significant change for other enterprises.  The insignificant effects 




employment across the board, are puzzling.  We intend to do further research to identify 
whether more detailed data on investment categories could show a shift among non-SOEs 
towards labor-saving technology as a result of the reform.   
  Our most robust finding is the significant reduction in employment among treated 
firms.  Treated firms reduced employment between 6 and 8 percentage points.  One 
policy problem that should be considered for future research is whether encouraging such 
labor-saving changes are optimal.  Policy changes in both developed and developing 
countries appear to be encouraging manufacturing growth which leads to small increases 
in employment.  For the US, for example, Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan and Phillips 
(2011)  show  that  falling  prices  of  investment  goods  led  to  a  reduction  in  domestic 
manufacturing employment. 
  Since the benefits from the reform in terms of increasing aggregate investment and 
even  productive  investment  seem  quite  limited,  one  question  is  why  the  reform  was 
extended to the rest of China.  One likely explanation is that extending the reform to the 
rest of China was part of a comprehensive stimulus package in response to the 2008-2009 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Value Added Tax: 1998-2007 
Treated sectors in treated prov  Control sectors in treated prov 






# of Obs.  Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
log(Labor) 1894660 4.75 1.15 0.00 12.15
log(Fixedasset) 1894660 8.28 1.71 -0.16 18.03
log(Fixed assets for production) 1825161 8.44 1.70 -1.21 18.68
log(Investment) 823890 6.72 2.12 -6.55 17.26
log(Output) 1894660 9.96 1.36 0.62 19.49
Profit/Industrial sales 1893780 0.00 6.66 -7710.80 2515.00
log(TFP) 1825161 2.00 0.37 -0.19 14.06
Export Intensity 1893780 0.17 0.34 0 1
Foreign Share 1894645 0.07 0.24 0 1
HKTM Share 1590548 0.08 0.25 0 1
State Share 1894627 0.10 0.29 0 1
Age 1892729 14.65 12.57 1 819
!"#$%&'(&)*++",-&)."./0./10&23&4%-&5",/"#$%06&'778&9&:;;<
Notes: Labor is measured by the total number of employees. Total fixed asset, fixed asset for production, 
and value of output are deflated values. Investment is calculated as the growth of fixed assets for 
production plus depreciation. TFP is estimated using OLS fixed effect method. Export intensity is defined 
as the export procurement divided by industrial sales.  Foreign share contributed by HK-Taiwan-Macau 
equals the share of firms' total equity owned by investors from HK-Taiwan-Macau. foreign share 
contributed by other countries is defined as the share of firms’ total equity owned by investors outside HK-
Taiwan-Macau, principally from OECD countries. State share equals the proportion of firms' state assets 
to its total equity. 
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
1998 0.0888 0.0915 0.0734 0.0782 0.0919 0.0947 0.0955 0.0960 0.0869 0.0922
1999 0.0888 0.0976 0.0773 0.0798 0.0912 0.1021 0.0940 0.0965 0.0867 0.1150
2000 0.0925 0.1289 0.0776 0.2268 0.0964 0.1025 0.1012 0.1066 0.0855 0.0895
2001 0.0921 0.0985 0.0831 0.0902 0.0943 0.1008 0.0965 0.1040 0.0883 0.0866
2002 0.0890 0.0972 0.0799 0.0923 0.0914 0.0986 0.0918 0.1002 0.0898 0.0891
2003 0.0920 0.1010 0.0795 0.0902 0.0953 0.1040 0.0954 0.1056 0.0947 0.0904
2004 0.1032 0.1118 0.0896 0.1002 0.1067 0.1150 0.1055 0.1161 0.1157 0.1003
2005 0.0952 0.1033 0.0955 0.0930 0.0952 0.1063 0.0936 0.1070 0.1181 0.0920
2006 0.0872 0.1083 0.0875 0.0951 0.0872 0.1119 0.0867 0.1126 0.0976 0.0933
2007 0.0849 0.1040 0.0854 0.0980 0.0849 0.1047 0.0844 0.1043 0.0999 0.1222
Observations 88,200 1,805,580 15,466 353,294 72,733 1,452,275 62,479 1,284,952 10,254 167,323
Total 0.0911 0.1048 0.0848 0.1022 0.0924 0.1054 0.0923 0.1065 0.0936 0.0964
Note: This table compares the evolution of value added tax between treated and control firms. The variable value added tax is constrcted 
from the ratio of reported value added tax to reported industrial sales.
Table 2. Evolution of Value Added Tax, 1998 - 2007






All Domestic Foreign All Domestic Foreign
(1) (2) !"# !$# (5) !%#
Foreign Share -0.178 -3.453 &'()*+ -0.159 -3.766 &'()*+
(0.30)*** (3.023) !'('$,# (0.027)*** (2.884) !'('$,#
HKTM Share -0.662 -0.862 &)('$- -0.671 -0.884 &)('$-
(0.044)*** (1.180) !'(',*#... (0.040)*** (1.120) !'(',*#...
State Share 0.231 0.173 '(,*$ 0.160 0.113 '(,*$
(0.033)*** (0.035)*** !'('-,#... (0.026)*** (0.028)*** !'('-,#...
Export Share -0.027 -0.282 '()", -0.048 -0.290 '()",
(0.027) (0.041)*** !'('"%#... (0.024)** (0.0366)*** !'('"%#...
log(Output) -0.181 -0.180 &'()-) -0.149 -0.142 &'()-)
(0.011)*** (0.012)*** !'(')-#... (0.009)*** (0.010)*** !'(')-#...
log(Fixedasset) 0.122 0.130 '('+, 0.113 0.118 '('+,
(0.007) (0.008)*** !'(')/#... (0.006)*** (0.007)*** !'(')/#...
Age -0.004 -0.003 &'(''+ -0.004 -0.003 &'(''+
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** !'(''/#... (0.001)*** (0.001)*** !'(''/#...
log(TFP) 0.198 0.189 '(/,$ 0.161 0.143 '(/,$
(0.032)*** (0.036)*** !'(',$#... (0.027)*** (0.031)*** !'(',$#...
Obervations 97916 70851 "",-- 126580 92992 "",--
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0743 0.0671 '()//- 0.0719 0.0645 '()//-
Table 3. Determinants of Value Added Tax Reform Policy Treatment  
Outcome = DIF (2003, 2007) Outcome = DIF (After 2004,  Before 2004)
Value Added Tax Reform (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Note: This table tests whether variables we used for matching are important determinants of policy treatment. Four different 
variable specifications were used: Specification 1 from column (1) to (3) defines outcome variables as the growth from 2003 to 
2007, and control variables as the mean between 1998 and 2003; specification 2 in column (4) to (6) defines outcome variables as 
the difference between 2003 and 2007, and control variables as the average between 1998 and 2003. * significant at 10% level, ** 






Treated Matched t-stat p-value
Foreign Share 0.125 0.125 -0.300 97.6 -0.130 0.893
HKTM Share 0.035 0.033 0.700 97.9 0.460 0.643
State Share 0.114 0.112 0.700 96.4 0.280 0.780
Export Share 0.165 0.162 0.900 93.6 0.470 0.642
log(Output) 10.018 10.016 0.200 97.5 0.070 0.940
log(Fixedasset) 8.707 8.692 0.900 94.0 0.420 0.673
Age 15.199 15.251 -0.500 52.8 -0.210 0.835
log(TFP) 1.935 1.929 2.300 -374.9 1.080 0.278
Foreign Share 0.000 0.000 -0.100 98.0 -0.060 0.953
HKTM Share 0.000 0.000 -0.100 97.1 -0.040 0.966
State Share 0.130 0.133 -1.000 94.1 -0.370 0.710
Export Share 0.063 0.064 -0.600 97.8 -0.270 0.789
log(Output) 9.872 9.863 0.800 82.6 0.300 0.764
log(Fixedasset) 8.536 8.533 0.200 98.9 0.080 0.934
Age 16.228 16.331 -0.800 64.3 -0.320 0.751
log(TFP) 1.910 1.902 3.100 -213.2 1.260 0.209
Foreign Share 0.4745 0.4733 0.3000 99.1 0.08 0.939
HKTM Share 0.1275 0.1307 -1.0000 98.7 -0.31 0.755
State Share 0.0658 0.0723 -4.3000 82.6 -0.92 0.357
Export Share 0.4430 0.4273 3.7000 -15.7 0.90 0.370
log(Output) 10.3850 10.4120 -2.1000 81.0 -0.51 0.611
log(Fixedasset) 9.1595 9.1984 -2.3000 71.6 -0.55 0.582
Age 12.3980 12.4370 -0.6000 91.5 -0.14 0.886
log(TFP) 2.0042 2.0049 -0.3000 -43.7 -0.06 0.954
Foreign Share 0.113 0.115 -0.600 94.3 -0.310 0.755
HKTM Share 0.033 0.031 0.800 97.4 0.680 0.497
State Share 0.137 0.135 0.700 96.2 0.330 0.742
Export Share 0.151 0.149 0.700 96.0 0.380 0.707
log(Output) 9.922 9.930 -0.600 88.4 -0.320 0.749
log(Fixedasset) 8.638 8.624 0.800 94.8 0.450 0.654
Age 15.973 15.980 -0.100 97.7 -0.030 0.975
log(TFP) 1.914 1.911 1.100 -201.3 0.610 0.542
Foreign Share 0.000 0.000 -0.100 97.9 -0.080 0.933
HKTM Share 0.000 0.000 0.000 98.5 -0.030 0.980
State Share 0.158 0.163 -1.500 90.4 -0.650 0.514
Export Share 0.059 0.061 -0.800 96.8 -0.430 0.665
log(Output) 9.779 9.775 0.400 85.9 0.180 0.854
log(Fixedasset) 8.482 8.484 -0.100 99.4 -0.050 0.958
Age 17.075 17.165 -0.700 79.4 -0.300 0.761
log(TFP) 1.891 1.884 2.400 -450.2 1.080 0.280
Foreign Share !"#$%&'( !"#$%&'( &'") **"! &'"'# '"*+!
HKTM Share '"($'(, '"($(#+ &'"! **"! &'"(+ '",-,
State Share '"'-!)( '"'-,(! &)"! *'", &'"+- '"+##
Export Share '"!)--$ '"!()#- $"+ $,"* '"*+ '"$!)
log(Output) ('"$) ('"$!$ &("- ,(") &'"!# '"#!!
log(Fixedasset) *"'*-- *"()!$ &("+ ,+ &'"!( '"#,(
Age ()"#*) ()"#,) '"( *#"- '"'! '"*-
log(TFP) ("**$- ("**)) '"# -'"* '"(! '",,#
Outcome = DIF(2003, 2007)






Note: This table tests whether there’s significant difference between treated and matched groups on potential determinants of policy 
treatment. Four different variable specifications were used: Specification 1 defines outcome variables as the growth from 2003 to 
2007, and control variables as the mean between 1998 and 2003; specification 2 defines outcome variables as the difference 
between means post and before treatment, and control variables as the average between 1998 and 2003. 
Table 4. Balancing tests for propensity score matching 








Matching Estimate Std. Err. T-stat Untreated Treated Untreated Treated
VAT/Industrial sales -0.008 (0.002)*** -3.31 93525 4304 0 87
log(Labor) -0.077 (0.011)*** -7.30 93536 4304 0 87
log(Fixed assets for production) -0.047 (0.019)** -2.43 88045 3944 0 80
log(Investment) 0.014 (0.069) 0.2 31876 1200 0 24
Profit/Industrial sales 0.021 (0.012)* 1.81 93525 4304 0 87
log(TFP) 0.010 (0.006) 1.6 88045 3944 0 80
Export Intensity -0.021 (0.003)*** -6.25 93525 4304 0 87
VAT/Industrial sales -0.013 (0.003)*** -4.39 67642 3145 0 64
log(Labor) -0.0763 (0.012)*** -6.18 67649 3145 0 64
log(Fixed assets for production) -0.0229 (0.023) -0.98 63776 2884 0 58
log(Investment) -0.0440 (0.084) -0.52 21772 860 0 17
Profit/Industrial sales 0.0376 (0.016)** 2.37 67642 3145 0 64
log(TFP) 0.0055 (0.007) 0.74 63776 2884 0 58
Export Intensity -0.0075 (0.003)*** -2.57 67642 3145 0 64
VAT/Industrial sales -0.007 (0.003)*** -2.91 63327 2867 0 58
log(Labor) -0.078 (0.013)*** -6.09 63327 2867 0 58
log(Fixed assets for production) -0.032 (0.025) -1.32 59825 2622 0 53
log(Investment) -0.031 (0.089) -0.34 20465 790 0 16
Profit/Industrial sales -0.004 (0.010) -0.38 63327 2867 0 58
log(TFP) 0.005 (0.008) 0.65 59825 2622 0 53
Export Intensity -0.008 (0.003)** -2.39 63327 2867 0 58
VAT/Industrial sales -0.076 (0.030)** -2.53 3975 279 0 5
log(Labor) -0.0597 (0.045) -1.33 3975 279 0 5
log(Fixed assets for production) 0.1226 (0.073)* 1.66 3644 262 0 5
log(Investment) 0.1680 (0.264) 0.64 1165 70 0 1
Profit/Industrial sales 0.4754 (0.234)** 2.03 3975 279 0 5
log(TFP) 0.0026 (0.031) 0.08 3644 262 0 5
Export Intensity -0.0034 (0.006) -0.59 3975 279 0 5
VAT/Industrial sales 0.005 (0.004) 1.12 25883 1159 0 23
log(Labor) -0.0616 (0.030)*** -3.03 25887 1159 0 23
log(Fixed assets for production) -0.0801 (0.032)** -2.50 24269 1061 0 21
log(Investment) 0.1849 (0.121) 1.53 9171 341 0 6
Profit/Industrial sales -0.0163 (0.005)*** -3.02 25883 1159 0 23
log(TFP) 0.0172 (0.012) 1.39 24269 1061 0 21
Export Intensity -0.0601 (0.010)*** -5.98 25883 1159 0 23
All Sample




Table 5.1. The Impact of Value-Added Tax Reform on Firm Behavior -- Outcome = DIF(2003, 2007)






Matching Estimate Std. Err. T-stat Untreated Treated Untreated Treated
VAT/Industrial sales -0.003 (0.009) -0.35 120787 5678 0 115
log(Labor) -0.118 (0.009)*** -13.22 120793 5678 0 115
log(Fixed assets for production) -0.023 (0.014) -1.61 118833 5598 0 114
log(Investment) -0.029 (0.038) -0.77 72096 2940 0 59
Profit/Industrial sales 0.139 (0.081)* 1.72 120787 5678 0 115
log(TFP) -0.009 (0.005)* -1.93 118833 5598 0 114
Export Intensity -0.019 (0.002)*** -7.67 120787 5678 0 115
VAT/Industrial sales -0.020 (0.06)*** -3.39 88651 4255 0 86
log(Labor) -0.116 (0.010)*** -11.47 88657 4255 0 86
log(Fixed assets for production) 0.008 (0.017) 0.46 87098 4192 0 85
log(Investment) -0.049 (0.046) -1.08 50625 2121 0 43
Profit/Industrial sales 0.196 (0.107)* 1.82 88651 4255 0 86
log(TFP) -0.012 (0.005)** -2.21 87098 4192 0 85
Export Intensity -0.011 (0.002)*** -5.06 88651 4255 0 86
VAT/Industrial sales -0.021 (0.007)*** -3.27 80526 3744 0 76
log(Labor) -0.124 (0.010)*** -12 80529 3744 0 76
log(Fixed assets for production) 0.002 (0.018) 0.12 79273 3689 0 75
log(Investment) -0.026 (0.049) -0.53 45953 1863 0 38
Profit/Industrial sales -0.017 (0.005)*** -3.11 80526 3744 0 76
log(TFP) -0.019 (0.005)*** -3.51 79273 3689 0 75
Export Intensity -0.012 (0.002)*** -5.07 80526 3744 0 76
VAT/Industrial sales -0.0229 (0.011)** -2.02 7342 511 0 10
log(Labor) -0.0793 (0.032)** -2.41 7342 511 0 10
log(Fixed assets for production) 0.0474 (0.043) 1.09 7072 503 0 10
log(Investment) -0.1833 (0.128) -1.43 4159 258 0 5
Profit/Industrial sales 1.7379 (1.221) 1.42 7342 511 0 10
log(TFP) 0.0284 (0.020) 1.42 7072 503 0 10
Export Intensity 0.0005 (0.004) 0.11 7341 511 0 10
VAT/Industrial sales 0.054 (0.034) 1.58 32136 1423 0 29
log(Labor) -0.092 (0.019)*** -4.96 32136 1423 0 29
log(Fixed assets for production) -0.081 (0.026)*** -3.13 31735 1407 0 28
log(Investment) 0.055 (0.067) 0.82 20369 819 0 16
Profit/Industrial sales 0.023 (0.030) 0.76 32136 1423 0 29
log(TFP) 0.003 (0.009) 0.28 31735 1407 0 28
Export Intensity -0.043 (0.007)*** -5.72 32136 1423 0 29
All Sample





Table 5.2. The Impact of Value-Added Tax Reform on Firm Behavior -- Outcome = DIF(Before 2004, After 2004)





VARIABLES log(Labor) log(K for production) log(Investment) Profit/Sales log(TFP) Export Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"$"$%%% !"#"&'(%%% !"#"$&) !"#"*+$ "#"$,$%%% "#""--$%%%
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ."#""$,+/ ."#"",$)/ ."#"**'/ ."#"*('/ ."#""*&$/ ."#""&(,/
Observations ')0'&, '*0",$ $$0"'- ')0'&, '*0",$ ')0'&,
R-squared "#*&+ "#&+$ "#"(* "#"", "#*"& "#"",
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"*+'%%% !"#"**,%%% !"#"&'" !"#"-*( "#"$))%%% !"#""$''%%
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ."#""-*)/ ."#"")(+/ ."#"*)*/ ."#"$(*/ ."#""*-+/ ."#""&(+/
Observations )"0+(& ,,0)&$ *$0"), )"0+(& ,,0)&$ )"0+(&
R-squared "#*"( "#&+' "#"(' "#"") "#*&$ "#"",
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"*)$%%% !"#"*&+%%% !"#"&+& !"#"&', "#"$('%%% !"#""$'&%%
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ."#""-$'/ ."#"")+&/ ."#"*+&/ ."#"*("/ ."#""*("/ ."#""&,+/
Observations ,,0*(* ,*0-', *&0,', ,,0*(* ,*0-', ,,0*(*
R-squared "#*"& "#&'& "#",$ "#""- "#*** "#"",
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"(-"%%% !"#"-*" !"#")&( !"#$+& "#",$(%%% !"#""('$%
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ."#"&),/ ."#"$&&/ ."#&&"/ ."#$'+/ ."#"&*+/ ."#""$-$/
Observations -0('' -0*&) &0$+" -0('' -0*&) -0(''
R-squared "#&(- "#"+' "#"$, "#"(+ "#&*+ "#"*"
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"$("%%% !"#""'++ !"#"-"& "#"&*'%%% "#"$$)%%% "#"*)$%%%
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ."#"")&'/ ."#"&&)/ ."#"-*-/ ."#""*-$/ ."#""-&$/ ."#""$+,/
Observations *)0",( *(0$(" &"0"&+ *)0",( *(0$(" *)0",(
R-squared "#*(+ "#&(- "#"$, "#"-& "#&)- "#"&&














VARIABLES log(Labor) log(K for production) log(Investment) Profit/Sales log(TFP) Export Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"$%&''' !"#""(%) "#""$(" !"#$*& "#"%(&''' "#""&*"'''
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) +"#""%"*, +"#"")-*, +"#"(%%, +"#$$$, +"#""(*), +"#""((*,
Observations ($&.*/" ($).*)" -*."0% ($&.*/" ($).*)" ($&.*/"
R-squared "#$0* "#$$$ "#"*0 "#""$ "#$** "#""-
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"$(*''' !"#""%-$ "#"(/% !"#%$) "#"%)(''' !"#""()%
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) +"#""%*), +"#""*&%, +"#"(*0, +"#$/-, +"#""(/$, +"#""((-,
Observations 0$.00$ 0(.%-" *$.-/- 0$.00$ 0(.%-" 0$.00$
R-squared "#$-* "#$$* "#"&& "#""$ "#$&( "#""&
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"(/-''' !"#""&%* "#"$%- !"#""*$$ "#"%$)''' !"#""(//
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) +"#""%&/, +"#""*/&, +"#"(&&, +"#""&&/, +"#""(-/, +"#""($-,
Observations /).%)& /%."%) )-./*% /).%)& /%."%) /).%)&
R-squared "#$*) "#$$/ "#"-$ "#""( "#$/" "#""&
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"*&"''' !"#"(/& !"#"**% !$#*** "#")//''' "#""$&"
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) +"#"($*, +"#"(0), +"#"*)&, +$#$0$, +"#""0$*, +"#""$(%,
Observations /.&)& /.%%& ).0%) /.&)& /.%%& /.&)&
R-squared "#$)) "#((* "#"%& "#"(% "#(/% "#"(-
VAT/Sales Reduction !"#"%$%''' !"#"""&$" !"#"$(" !"#"$/) "#"$-)''' "#"$/"'''
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) +"#""*0&, +"#""/-&, +"#"$)", +"#")$*, +"#""$0$, +"#""$0%,
Observations %%.*// %%.(-" $$.%"& %%.*// %%.(-" %%.*//





Notes: This table presents OLS estimation results. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 











VARIABLES log(Labor) log(K for production) log(Investment) Profit/Sales log(TFP) Export Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VAT/Sales Reduction !"!#$%&& '(")$$&& '%"$$* #"++* !"(++ #"#*+ '#"(!!&&
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ,!"!!))%- ,%".!!- ,%"#$#- ,%"++#- ,#".*!- ,!"*)#- ,!")!)-
Observations *)/*#$ *)/*#$ *%/!$. ../!*( *)/*#$ *%/!$. *)/*#$
VAT/Sales Reduction !"!%)+&&& '."!!(&&& '!"$() '!"..# !"()% !"(+# '!".!$&&
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ,!"!!*!+- ,#"!%0- ,!"0*#- ,#"*!*- ,#"!0(- ,!"..$- ,!"#(*-
Observations )!/0+# )!/0+# $$/)#. %./!)$ )!/0+# $$/)#. )!/0+#
VAT/Sales Reduction !"!%0)&&& '%"0%%&&& '!"0*$ '!"+%) '!"*)# !"+.+ '!"%*$&&
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ,!"!!*(0- ,!"*)+- ,!"*#0- ,#")*0- ,!"*0#- ,!".+%- ,!"#+!-
Observations $$/%+% $$/%+% $%/(*$ %#/$*$ $$/%+% $%/(*$ $$/%+%
VAT/Sales Reduction !"!#($ '$"!*( 0"#(+ '.+"+0 *"%%! '#"!.) '!"%0.
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ,!"!.!*- ,#."!(- ,%$"()- ,()!"*- ,%%"$#- ,("+0+- ,!")#$-
Observations (/+** (/+** (/%#) #/.0! (/+** (/%#) (/+**
VAT/Sales Reduction '!"!#%* ("%%* ."*0$ '()"!. !"+%+ '#"#)# ."%%$
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) ,!"!#(0- ,+"!))- ,("!!.- ,%*)"$- ,!"0+$- ,#"%#(- ,%"+))-
Observations %)/!$+ %)/!$+ %+/.+! #!/!#0 %)/!$+ %+/.+! %)/!$+
All Foreign
Notes: This table presents IV estimation results. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 







VARIABLES log(Labor) log(K for production) log(Investment) Profit/Sales log(TFP) Export Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VAT/Sales Reduction !"!#$%&&& '("))*&&& '!"!%+% !"$+* +"*#, !"!##! '!")*(&&&
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) -!"!!.+,/ -$",$+/ -!",%*/ -$"$#+/ -+"*!)/ -!"#!!/ -!"#+)/
Observations $#.0,)! $#.0,)! $#(0,(! +,0!%* $#.0,)! $#(0,(! $#.0,)!
VAT/Sales Reduction !"!*(*&&& '*"((.&&& !"(.$ '!"((% ,".,+ '!"$*+ '!"**%&&&
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) -!"!!+)$/ -!")!%/ -!"(,#/ -!"+%(/ -,"+!%/ -!"$((/ -!"$!$/
Observations %#0%%# %#0%%# %$0*+! ,#0+)+ %#0%%# %$0*+! %#0%%#
VAT/Sales Reduction !"!*.)&&& '*"!#,&&& !")*#& !"$+$ '!",!, '!"$., '!"**,&&&
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) -!"!!)**/ -!"+$#/ -!"()%/ -!")()/ -!"*$*/ -!"$(#/ -!"$!$/
Observations )(0*(. )(0*(. )*0!*( (+0),* )(0*(. )*0!*( )(0*(.
VAT/Sales Reduction !"!*!. '("*)! '!"#$! '#"+$$ '#",,* '!"!##% '!"!)*)
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) -!"!##./ -*"*$(/ -$"$*$/ -#"$*#/ -$("+(/ -!"(%./ -!"$.$/
Observations )0.(. )0.(. )0**. (0%*( )0.(. )0**. )0.(.
VAT/Sales Reduction '!"!!))! .",#+ *"+%) '("*)# '*"!%# '$"#)) #"+(!
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) -!"!$**/ -$!"#$/ -,"(%+/ -,"(!#/ -."*,,/ -$",),/ -#".$*/




Notes: This table presents IV estimation results. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAT policy 8,738* 8,857* -0.0925*** 2,331 2,935 -0.111***
(4,863) (4,780) (0.00843) (2,471) (2,782) (0.00855)
Firm size (logSales) 397.9 490.6 0.00892*** 3,843*** 2,934** 0.00745***
(3,561) (3,187) (0.00153) (1,480) (1,447) (0.00162)
Profit 0.870* 0.692 0.284 0.115
(0.509) (0.451) (0.174) (0.167)
Foreign Share -8,722*** -7,914*** 0.146*** -6,455*** -5,241*** 0.182***
(2,423) (2,280) (0.00751) (1,622) (1,545) (0.00794)
HKTM Share -1,778* -1,599* 0.0672*** -2,438*** -1,987** 0.0956***
(976.4) (934.4) (0.00701) (905.2) (849.4) (0.00732)
State Share 10,257*** 9,330*** -0.352*** 9,385*** 7,307*** -0.428***
(3,173) (3,005) (0.00698) (2,422) (2,198) (0.00717)
Export Share 2,051 1,702 0.0209*** -324.2 -431.9 0.00127
(1,670) (1,472) (0.00587) (644.7) (607.1) (0.00607)
Profit-sales ratio 0.000218 -0.00102
(0.00125) (0.00161)
Observations 91,578 90,975 121,597 96,222 95,459 128,777
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.087 0.062 0.036 0.018 0.007 0.047
Table A1. Replicate Nie et al (2010) results: All Sample










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAT policy 91,828** 94,221** -0.0785** 28,810 37,324 -0.0767**
(40,327) (39,737) (0.0313) (20,795) (24,395) (0.0315)
Firm size (logSales) 14,816*** 14,032*** 0.0140*** 10,016** 8,651** 0.00940**
(4,148) (3,977) (0.00385) (3,982) (3,793) (0.00406)
Profit 0.765 0.692 1.559*** 1.291***
(0.691) (0.637) (0.590) (0.500)
Foreign Share -153,072 -141,586 -0.622 -289,068** -273,298** -0.321
(133,346) (129,895) (0.465) (129,113) (132,694) (0.376)
HKTM Share -78,407 -112,568 -0.119 -319,417* -312,192* -0.0675
(128,457) (124,240) (0.302) (188,349) (172,661) (0.332)
State Share 8,366 237.5 -0.0364 -5,317 -11,736 -0.0458*
(12,497) (16,769) (0.0222) (10,809) (15,119) (0.0244)
Export Share -36,952** -39,383*** -0.0673 -26,949** -31,486** -0.117**
(14,490) (13,981) (0.0532) (13,437) (13,086) (0.0563)
Profit-sales ratio 0.0112* 0.0142
(0.00639) (0.00899)
Observations 7,423 7,344 8,217 7,996 7,882 8,995
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.055 0.054 0.008 0.151 0.119 0.010
Table A2. Replicate Nie et al (2010) results: Stateowned Firms



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAT policy -2,174 -2,214 -0.0920*** -993.1 -1,262 -0.112***
(1,941) (1,741) (0.00871) (1,087) (977.6) (0.00885)
Firm size (logSales) -3,995 -3,843 0.0101*** 1,938 1,011 0.00926***
(4,482) (4,005) (0.00170) (1,267) (1,139) (0.00180)
Profit 0.898 0.694 -0.0306 -0.173**
(0.610) (0.543) (0.0746) (0.0753)
Foreign Share -5,085** -4,027** 0.141*** -2,078* -997.5 0.174***
(2,154) (1,979) (0.00754) (1,253) (1,137) (0.00796)
HKTM Share -335.2 -128.0 0.0626*** -1,181 -800.8 0.0895***
(1,142) (1,043) (0.00703) (881.8) (793.3) (0.00734)
State Share 12,089** 9,538** -0.348*** 1,954 -156.0 -0.410***
(5,287) (4,777) (0.0123) (2,680) (2,276) (0.0124)
Export Share 2,350 1,919 0.0202*** -787.5 -834.3* 0.000763
(1,831) (1,628) (0.00591) (478.9) (438.1) (0.00611)
Profit-sales ratio -0.000215 -0.00151
(0.000849) (0.00117)
Observations 84,155 83,631 113,380 88,226 87,577 119,782
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.136 0.102 0.019 0.002 0.011 0.024
Table A3. Replicate Nie et al (2010) results: Non-stateowned  Firms
1999-2003 and 2005 1998-2007